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The incoming prime minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen (who replaced Anders Fogh Rasmussen), was much less of a knight of principles than his predecessor. Indeed, Russia has several times showed its willingness to use energy as a weapon, as in 2006, when a gas dispute ended in the transit of gas through Ukraine being shut down in the midst of a cold winter.Īll in all, Denmark was largely caught unprepared in this story of gas geopolitics.
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This has led many countries, especially in eastern Europe and the Baltic region, to sound the alarm: too much dependence on Russian energy is considered risky.
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The EU currently imports almost 40% of its natural gas from Russia through pipelines running through Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic Sea. The Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines should therefore be seen as a way for Russia to gain the upper hand in the European region. Smaller countries like Denmark should take this into account when formulating security strategies to avoid contributing to overdependence on a single energy supplier and the vulnerability this entails.Īs far back as the 1990s, the Russian prime minister Yevgeny Primakov announced that Russia would use energy as a weapon in its foreign-policy toolbox. (Russian) energy as a weaponĮnergy is a central aspect of the security strategies of the great powers. Taking the three negotiating processes as examples of how Denmark developed strategies on the go, other countries can learn from the Danish experience. Being self-sufficient in natural gas from the Danish gas fields in the North Sea, the issue for Denmark was not the gas: the problems of the Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe were almost exclusively political for Denmark. So, when Denmark got caught up in international energy geopolitics concerning the two Nord Stream pipelines that are intended to bring natural gas from Russia to northern Germany, and when the Baltic Pipe planned to start pumping Norwegian gas to Poland, the country had to make up a strategy on the go. This position fed into an understanding of energy crises as something that largely happened elsewhere. A better politics of energy alliances and better strategic preparation are key lessons for small states like Denmark when dealing with the problematic combination of security and energy.ĭenmark has been self-sufficient in its energy supplies since the mid-1990s, and energy has been dealt with largely as a technical issue pertaining to the accessibility, affordability and accountability of energy sources. Small states should prioritise sending experts to the NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security in order to stay on top of the international security situation concerning energy.ĭenmark encountered a number of unforeseen obstacles when negotiating the Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe gas pipelines, and the country ended up standing exposed and alone. Small states should strive to build enduring political alliances focused on energy. Self-sufficiency in energy does not mean that a country is shielded from the dynamics of international energy. Small states should include energy in strategic documents pertaining to foreign and security policies, as energy is a tool in the security toolbox of the great powers.